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contention. 
     This friction is particularly rele-
vant in respect to the Arab Spring 
uprisings, which can be linked to a 
broader public rejection of neolib-
eral economics.2 My interest in this 
issue led me to study the Tunisian 
national trade union, the Union 
Générale Tunisienne du Travail 
(UGTT). As evidenced by the wide-
spread protests leading to the Tuni-
sian revolution in 2011, the Tunisian 
worker was not sufficiently aided by 
the efforts of the UGTT. However, 
the union (along with three other 
major civil society organizations) 
was entrusted with the task of es-
tablishing order in 2014 during a 
political crisis which threatened 
the democracy won by the Tuni-
sian revolution.3 In the context of 
Tunisian labor relations and gov-
ernment power,4 I chose to exam-
ine the UGTT as both a wielder of 
citizens’ and the state’s faith: two 
forces which are often diametrically 
opposed yet find an ostensible con-
fluence via the union. 
Background
     Tunisia’s history with trade 
unionism can be traced back to 
the origins of the decades-long in-
dependence movement against 
French occupation5—an important 
relationship between the social and 
the political sphere that the trade 
union presently works to maintain. 
Before the creation of the UGTT, 
there existed first the Confédération 
Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens 
(CGTT), a trade union founded in 
1924 by Mohammad Ali al Hammi 
which aligned itself with the Tuni-
sian nationalist and anti-colonial 
Destour party. This was the first 
What does the existence of a national trade union mean? As a 
form, the institution rose in popu-
larity and necessity after the Indus-
trial Revolution, and its multina-
tional presence has also depended 
on the simultaneous proliferation of 
the industrial sector in each coun-
try. As labor was forced into moder-
nity via the leveraging of wages, so 
too was the work force galvanized 
to stave off the most glaring parts 
of industrial working conditions by 
means of the formation of trade and 
labor unions. The existence of a na-
tional trade/labor union in a mod-
ern state is no new concept; many 
developed countries have significant 
proportions of their working popu-
lations involved in a trade union.1 
However, the efficacy and impact 
of these unions remains a point of 
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break from the French trade union, 
the Confédération Générale du Tra-
vail (CGT), to gain real autonomy 
on behalf of the Tunisian worker. 
The CGTT was quelled by the colo-
nial authorities. Years later in 1946, 
Farhat Hached formally established 
the UGTT.6 From the start, the 
union’s goal was to advocate for 
both workers’ rights and Tunisia’s 
independence from France. This 
duality is important to note here as I 
aim to trace the organization to the 
post-modern age in which there is 
no longer a direct colonial influence 
to point to, rather multiple forms of 
control (governmental, internation-
al, etc.) which the union ostensibly 
aims to subvert. 
     As was the case for other coun-
tries in the Maghreb with a histo-
ry of colonialism, the end of the 
colonial power did not lead to an 
increase in citizens’ power in the 
post-colonial state.7 In the absence 
of the French authority’s disci-
plinary control, power was simply 
transferred to new authoritarian 
(yet now described as “nationalist”) 
actors. The Neo-Destour party8 led 
the anti-colonial and nationalist ef-
fort to remove the French authority 
from Tunisia. After independence, 
this party assumed power. Howev-
er, there was a large conflict within 
Neo-Destour, primarily between its 
top leaders: Habib Bourguiba and 
Salah Ben Youssef.9 Due to his will-
ingness to accept the softer “auton-
omy” over independence, Bourgui-
ba chose to work with the leading 
French authorities in the process of 
independence, while Youssef took 
a more radical approach. Eventual-
ly, Bourguiba’s influence won over 
Youssef ’s and the former went on to 
become the first and longest Presi-
dent of Tunisia.10 Bourguiba also 
played a strong role in setting the 
tone of UGTT operations post-inde-
pendence.
     In order to understand the shifts 
that occurred in the UGTT post-rev-
olution in 2011, it is helpful to un-
derstand how the union changed 
after independence and how it op-
erated in the authoritarian regimes 
of both Habib Borguiba and Zine el 
Abidine Ben Ali. Much of the exist-
ing literature on the UGTT—partic-
ularly works written in or translated 
into English—focuses on its role in 
Tunisia’s revolution and the broader 
context of Arab Spring uprisings.11, 
12,13 For the scope of this study, how-
ever, it has been helpful to outline 
the nature of the UGTT pre-revo-
lution and the ways in which its in-
fluence was both strengthened and 
limited by the authoritarian regimes 
under which it operated. This is a 
theme that was also echoed in each 
interview I conducted. 
     Issue 56 of the Anarcho-Syndi-
calist Review discusses the ways in 
which the UGTT was suppressed by 
both Bourguiba and Ben Ali in the 
article: “Tunisia’s UGTT: Caught 
between struggle & betrayal.” The 
Bourguiba years held their fair 
share of conflict between the UGTT 
and the state, but in the ‘60s and ‘70s 
the former was allowed a relatively 
large level of autonomy. This auton-
omy subsequently led to planned 
retaliations by the state against the 
workers.14 One essential source to 
this discussion can be found in Is-
sue 67 of the Middle East Research 
and Information Project (MERIP) 
Journal, which included a report 
on a UGTT strike in late January 
of 1978: “A general strike called by 
the half-strong Union générale des 
travailleurs tunisiens (UGTT) was 
met with violence by the regime. 
Army, police and paramilitary units 
joined in a general offensive against 
the workers, leaving more than two 
hundred dead and hundreds more 
injured and arrested.”15 While this 
report contextualizes the impor-
tance and danger of protesting with 
the UGTT, it also reveals looming 
disparities between the former and 
current images of the institution. 
Where a general strike would gar-
ner the response of state violence in 
1978, today the same action is part 
of the sanctioned list of responses 
allowed by the government appara-
tus in response to economic discon-
tent. This sort of clashing was not 
allowed to continue, however, in the 
Ben Ali era:      
In 1989, Ben Ali’s regime im-
posed direct submission on the 
UGTT leadership, headed by Is-
mail Sahbani, who collaborated 
in the implementation of neo-
liberal economic policies and 
fiercely fought the union left...
The history of the leadership of 
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who was enrolled in his graduate 
seminar.  The questioning for the in-
terviews done with members of the 
UGTT differed from the questions 
asked of non-members. The pur-
pose of interviewing non-members 
was largely to determine a sense of 
public perception rather than insti-
tutional or official knowledge about 
the inner structure/working of the 
organization. 
     Further, I was able to contextu-
alize my findings based on a series 
of lectures attended in September 
and October 2019 via SIT’s academ-
ic program and the course “Poli-
tics, Civil Society, and Migration 
in Tunisia.” This course provided 
me with a broad historical back-
ground regarding the politics of Tu-
nisia, especially regarding the forces 
that both pushed the revolution in 
2011 and facilitated the formation 
of government and order following 
the revolution. A program visit to 
the Forum Tunisien pour les Droits 
Économique et Sociaux (FTDES), a 
Tunisian NGO formed after the rev-
olution to organize social and po-
litical movements, also aided me in 
understanding how the civil society 
sector is related to the UGTT as well 
as the government. I utilized this 
visit in particular to inquire about 
the manner in which jobs are cre-
ated and provided in Tunisia by the 
government and the role of UGTT 
influence. The representative of the 
FTDES whom we met with was ex-
tremely helpful in providing this 
information. From this conversa-
party à la the 1979 Iranian revolu-
tion. In this way, it is viewed as a 
worthy representative of the Tuni-
sian people based on its ability to 
uphold and protect the democra-
cy that they were protesting for in 
2011. However, the same economic 
symptoms which persisted before 
the 2011 revolution continue to ex-
ist today, so it remains to be seen 
whether authoritarianism is truly 
what was holding the UGTT back 
from affecting a stronger position 
for labor in Tunisia. 
Methodology
Overview
     This research is based primari-
ly on interviews as well as scholar-
ly sources, some of which outline 
the history of Tunisia and the trade 
union movement, and others which 
discuss the politics in post-revolu-
tion Tunisia. I conducted a series of 
four interviews with Tunisians liv-
ing in Northern Tunisia during the 
fall of 2019. These interviews were 
conducted with two members of the 
UGTT as well as two non-members. 
Interviews conducted with members 
were completed in French/Arabic 
with the aid of a translator, while the 
interviews with non-members of the 
union were conducted in English. I 
was able to interview the members 
of the UGTT thanks to the connec-
tions of my professor, Mounir Khe-
lifa, and my advisor, Rached Khal-
ifa. My advisor also connected me 
with one of the non-member inter-
viewees, a female master’s student 
the UGTT is a story of betrayal 
and maneuvering. From its sup-
port for Ben Ali’s candidacy in 
the elections of 2004 and 2009 
to social welfare reform, from 
the implementation of neoliber-
al economic measures to their 
abandoning of the Gafsa UGTT 
activists, jailed during the 2008 
uprising, when they limited 
themselves to a simple request 
for the release of the prisoners.16
The union’s alignment with the re-
gime marks a shift in the ideological 
posture of the UGTT; rather than 
advocate for its rank-and-file mem-
bers, the leadership rallied behind 
the top-down neoliberalism of Ben 
Ali.
     In many ways, the union seems 
far from the description of a mono-
lith. It is comprised of twenty-four 
regional unions, ninteen sector 
federations, and twenty-one  gen-
eral unions with a total of around 
750,000 members from all geo-
graphic areas of Tunisia.17 This re-
gional component of diversity is a 
widely celebrated attribute of the 
union that is rare for many civil so-
ciety organizations, which in turn 
fosters the public’s trust in the insti-
tution. Even so, in the Post-Democ-
racy Era there remains the question 
of how much the UGTT can truly 
accomplish on behalf of the worker, 
especially when the country faces 
difficult economic conditions.18 It 
is often credited for “stabilization” 
post-revolution and the prevention 
of total state control by the Islamic 
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Higher Institute of Design. He was 
elected as a basic member in 2006. 
Khelifa was involved in the princi-
pal syndicalist sector of higher ed-
ucation and continues to work in 
this capacity as of the publication 
date of this paper. He describes his 
work with the union as generally 
low-maintenance, with the excep-
tion of election periods and more 
charged political climates—the 
zenith of these being the political 
climate during the 2011 revolution. 
Labassi had no official role in the 
UGTT at the time of the interview, 
but had been involved at the highest 
levels of the organization since 2002. 
He became Vice Secretary General 
of the trade union of teachers and 
a member of the national council 
of trade union university teachers 
during his time of involvement be-
fore stepping down in 2014. He con-
tinued to work with the UGTT fol-
lowing 2014 as a consultant. 
2. Perception
     Khelifa began by qualifying his 
view of his membership: that it was 
beneficial “psychologically” but not 
“financially” (though he said that he 
enjoys it because of this reason).19 
He highlighted the importance and 
power of the union: when we talk 
about what strikes or movements 
can take place, the UGTT is quite 
important because it can decide the 
level of success due to its ties with 
influential people in the govern-
ment. Under the old regimes, the 
organization was not “too free to 
Research Findings
     I will present the interviews I 
conducted in two major parts. I will 
present the perspectives of those 
who were involved in the UGTT 
directly in order to give a deeper 
understanding of how the union 
operates. My goal during these in-
terviews was to understand the 
more logistical aspects of member-
ship and the structure of the union, 
and subsequently to inquire about 
the political reach and aims of the 
UGTT from the perspective of a cur-
rent and former member. Secondly, 
I will present interviews with those 
who were not directly involved in 
the union so as to present a more 
general discussion of the influence 
and power of the UGTT, even to 
those who are not directly impacted 
by it via membership. My primary 
objective during these interviews 
was to openly question the inter-
viewees about their experience or 
their thoughts regarding the UGTT 
from their respective positions.
Members
1. Involvement
     The first two interviews were with 
Youssef Khelifa, a lecturer at the 
Higher Institute of Design of Tunis, 
and Tahar Labassi, a linguistics pro-
fessor at the University of Tunis and 
also the former Chief of Staff of the 
Minister of the Department of Edu-
cation in Tunisia. Khelifa had made 
a request to become a member of the 
UGTT in 2005; in order to join, he 
had to win favor in elections at the 
tion, it seemed that FTDES, though 
its organizational history is much 
shorter, faced a similar dilemma as 
the UGTT insofar as it created both 
an avenue for people to organize 
and a simultaneous entrenchment 
of the status quo which allowed— 
and perhaps encouraged—this sort 
of sanctioned form of protest.
Concerns
     Of course, this study must not 
be taken as representative of the 
Tunisian public or be generalized 
to make assumptions beyond the 
scope of the paper. Rather, this 
study can be used to further gener-
al discussion on the efficacy of the 
UGTT and how it operates in the 
socio-political space of Tunisia’s 
democracy. Multiple factors served 
as ethical concerns in the process 
of this research. The existence of a 
short time-frame to complete the 
interviews, as well as an effective 
language barrier, made it difficult 
to recruit interviewees and/or set 
up times for interviews that would 
be convenient for the interviewee, 
myself, and possibly a translator if 
needed. Thus, I was largely reliant 
on existing contacts in the Tunis 
area to find possible interviewees, 
introducing bias in my sample in 
terms of region and, likely, social 
status. These same biases exist due 
to the fact that no Tunisians living 
in southern Tunisia were represent-
ed in this research, even though 
some interviewees were originally 
from the South. 
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advocate for workers, but now, it 
is more free”20 to conduct its work. 
Before the revolution under Ben Ali 
and Bourguiba, there were acts of 
violence and armed, bloody con-
flicts between the UGTT and the 
state. Now that democracy has been 
achieved, there is no longer this sort 
of conflict. Khelifa lamented the fact 
that, though the UGTT has more 
power, the workers of Tunisia are 
suffering more than they were be-
fore the revolution due to a horde of 
economic reasons.
     He discussed the ways in which 
there was “certainly a change [in 
the UGTT] especially with the new 
emergence of Islamist parties”21 
post-revolution. Here, he pointed to 
what he called the real function and 
strength of the UGTT: to defend and 
secure modernity for the country.22 
To Khelifa, the UGTT aims to pro-
tect and make a consensus between 
the Islamist and Modernist par-
ties. This is why, he said, the UGTT 
worked against the Islamists after 
the revolution in order to stabilize 
the country. The UGTT supported 
many of the uprising movements at 
the time, so the government had to 
take it seriously due to the weight 
of the organization. The leadership 
works with both labor and the gov-
ernment, but from Khelifa’s point of 
view, the first objective is always to 
protect workers’ rights.
     Labassi had a more critical per-
ception of the UGTT, which he at-
tributed to his former degree of 
involvement in and now relative 
freedom from the organization.23 
He described the union as the only 
space where real politics was pos-
sible under the Ben Ali regime, 
though it was always committed to 
the upholding of the state. He ad-
mitted that today there is a question 
of whether or not the organization 
is actually a hindrance. He also de-
scribed the nature of the UGTT’s 
negotiations with the government, 
which usually operates by dealing 
with ministers of various depart-
ments of government. These min-
isters would often sign agreements 
with the UGTT that would purport-
edly meet the demands of workers, 
but due to the high turnover rate of 
ministers they knew that the onus 
would fall on a successive minister 
and likely not be upheld. He did not 
place all the blame on this pattern, 
noting that the government is under 
great economic pressure due to a 
lack of means. However, the UGTT 
faces pressure itself from the work-
ing class as the economic situation 
worsens while the cost of living ris-
es. 
     Labassi’s main qualm with the 
UGTT was in its failure (or as he 
called it, refusal) to change post-rev-
olution. To him, changing means 
working as a trade union should 
work in a traditional democracy. 
He believed that the UGTT does 
not want to change because it is in 
a rather favorable position: it has an 
effective monopoly on unionism in 
the country.24 The government can-
not give other trade unions many 
rights; the UGTT has made it so 
that only its own organization can 
win any favor in the eyes of the 
government. Labassi pointed to the 
UGTT’s failure to support the ini-
tial protests for the 2011 revolution, 
which began in the south of Tuni-
sia. The union chose to side with the 
existing regime at the time. How-
ever, the UGTT is also not officially 
part of the government.25 It plays a 
quasi-governmental role, and this 
is likely where it prefers to stay, ac-
cording to Labassi. He believed that 
the union should embrace a role in 
national politics and move towards 
the path of official institutionaliza-
tion on the federal level.
Non-Members
1. Involvement
     I interviewed Lassaad Bouat-
tour, a civil servant working for the 
Ministry of Finance in Tunisia, and 
Rawe Khefi, a master’s student at the 
Université de Tunis el Manar with-
in the Higher Institute of Human 
Sciences. Khefi had a background 
in unionism in her undergradu-
ate years, though not through the 
UGTT. Neither had any direct rela-
tionship with the UGTT, meaning 
that they were not nor had ever been 
part of the union, and did not know 
anyone beyond the level of acquain-
tanceship who was involved with 
the union.
2. Perception
     Bouattour outlined his major 
thoughts via a short history of the 
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and criticized its passivity regarding 
politics particularly after the Quar-
tet period of 2014. For these reasons, 
she did not think the UGTT would 
become popular among her genera-
tion as an avenue for activism or as 
a movement.
Discussion and Analysis
     A certain repetition took place 
during the course of each interview, 
wherein the interviewee would feel 
it necessary to outline the history of 
the UGTT/Tunisia before beginning 
to describe their own perception 
of the institution and/or how they 
were involved. Each gave a simi-
lar story of Tunisia’s history since 
the colonial period, though each 
differed in their explanations of 
why certain movements proceeded 
while others failed (e.g. Gafsa riots 
in 2008 vs. the Kasbah protests of 
2011). This pattern made sense—it 
is difficult to say what exactly the 
UGTT is or does without discussing 
its history. The past of the UGTT is 
precisely why it is valued as an in-
stitution in the Tunisian collective 
consciousness today. Though all the 
interviewees had different political 
leanings, they followed some sim-
ilarities in their beliefs, especially 
that the government must contin-
ue on a secular path and that the 
UGTT was helpful in this endeavor. 
Each was concerned by the threat 
of major Islamic political and social 
forces, the most prominent being 
the Ennahda political party which 
won the highest percentage of votes 
ties would come from membership 
in the party. Ultimately, he lauded 
the UGTT for its role in stabilizing 
the government post-revolution, but 
believed that they should not take 
their activities too far in the politi-
cal or social realm in order for the 
country to be able to grow econom-
ically.
     Khefi held a significantly differ-
ent view of the UGTT as compared 
to Bouattour. As someone who has 
been involved in leftist political 
movements for years in Tunisia, she 
hesitated to refer to the UGTT with 
total positivity. She did echo some of 
the major popular sentiments, like 
how the union was forced to con-
form to the state’s demands under 
Bourguiba and Ben Ali. She pointed 
out that they were able to gain some 
power during the Bread Riots in 
which they faced violence due to the 
protests that they were involved in. 
Khefi felt that the union generally 
stood up for the people against the 
government, and that the people do 
not forget it . 
     However, she criticized the 
union for its failure to support the 
miners’ protests in Gafsa in 2008 
and the initial seeds of revolution-
ary protests as well. She praised its 
ability to prevent the Islamist par-
ties from gaining too much power 
after the revolution and said that it 
was clearly committed to upholding 
the “Tunisian way of life.”30 Funda-
mentally, Khefi saw the UGTT as re-
maining more pro-government than 
pro-people following the revolution, 
UGTT’s activity since Tunisia’s co-
lonial period. He acknowledged it 
had a strong effect in the turn of in-
dependence. The syndicalist move-
ment was threatening to the colonial 
powers—this, according to Bouat-
tour, is why Farhat Hached26  was 
assassinated, an act which immor-
talized the UGTT as a symbol for 
the national spirit.27 After indepen-
dence, he noted, the Neo-Destour 
party and the UGTT viewed them-
selves as co-managers of the coun-
try—while this led to some clashes, 
the sharing of power was largely 
peaceful. Ben Ali was more author-
itarian; Bouattour emphasized that 
the president was dealing with not 
one, but two major entities that often 
opposed him: the UGTT and the Is-
lamic Tendency Movement (MTI).28 
Ben Ali would pick sides between 
UGTT and Islamists when it was 
convenient. Around 1991, however, 
Ben Ali became more hostile to-
wards the UGTT, insisting that the 
union would need to operate on his 
terms and that he would choose the 
members of its leadership. 
     Bouattour became most critical 
of the union when discussing the 
education sector. As a father him-
self, he remarked that the UGTT’s 
education sector union is “an enemy 
of any mother/father in Tunisia,”29 
especially after mass strikes by ed-
ucation workers last year. He also 
said that, today, the main way to get 
power is through the UGTT, while 
under Ben Ali similar benefits such 
as wage increases or job opportuni-
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in the last parliamentary elections.31 
     The difficulty in assessing the 
UGTT is multifaceted. The organi-
zation has a long and diverse histo-
ry which makes it difficult to tie to 
a coherent ethos over time, partic-
ularly due to the various treatment 
it has faced under multiple regimes 
and the various ways it chose to act 
under these regimes. The aim of 
this study is to attempt to accurate-
ly assess the union on both its own 
terms and on the terms to which the 
people of Tunisia hold it. To catego-
rize it via a traditional left vs. right 
dichotomy or the basic movement 
of state actors as the abstraction of 
the citizenry would be a mistake, as 
some have done.32 This would ignore 
the entire basis of the union as well 
as a larger critique of power from 
perspectives outside of the bipolar 
political field.
     As some interviewees mentioned, 
the ability of the union has depend-
ed on the environment around it. 
For Khelifa and Labassi, the UGTT 
is a strong if not the strongest Tu-
nisian institution and should be 
strengthened in the democratic era 
in order to be even more effective. 
Labassi saw the union moving for-
ward as a political party and taking 
on the responsibility that comes 
with governance rather than need-
ing to negotiate as a civil society 
group. To Khefi, who identifies as a 
leftist, the UGTT did not do enough 
for the worker, and it was unclear at 
best whether the union is suited to 
take on the post-modern socioeco-
nomic problems which the youth 
of Tunisia distinctly face.33 Howev-
er, to Bouattour, the UGTT is too 
tyrannical in its measures to advo-
cate for workers’ wages. It is these 
conflicting narratives that make it 
necessary to remove the lens of elec-
toral politics in order to observe the 
kind of organization that the UGTT 
is, or appears to be. In this analysis, 
I valued the perception rather than 
some measure of “true” existence 
because of my interest in how the 
citizens of Tunisia view the strength 
of class movements. Further, it is 
unclear whether the UGTT can be 
objectively defined.34 My purpose 
was to explore the effect of power 
and proximity to the state in an ef-
fort to fight for workers via a union 
organization.
Barriers
     In addition to the aforementioned 
difficulties, if this research was to be 
continued and expanded, it would 
be helpful to be able to speak to cur-
rent members of the executive board 
of the UGTT. This allows for an ad-
ditional level of perception which 
would contextualize the union 
more directly. Further, it would be 
useful to gather perceptions from 
those outside of the Tunis area, par-
ticularly in regions such as Gafsa, 
Sidi Bouzid, Gabes, etc. where the 
2011 revolution began and where 
the socioeconomic conditions dif-
fer. An increase in interviews with 
the inclusion of more demograph-
ics would aid this research as well. 
Moreover, in all such interactions, 
the presence of a reliable transla-
tor (or the personal development 
of Tunisian Arabic/French fluency) 
would be extremely important to re-
duce as much of the language barrier 
as possible. A translator would also 
be advantageous for reading sources 
and texts relating to the UGTT.
Conclusion
     Though my collection of inter-
views were limited in quantity, they 
provided me with a wide range of 
perspectives on the UGTT. These 
perspectives should not be used 
to reflect the actual and exact sen-
timents of all Tunisian people to-
wards the union, but can be useful 
in a discourse regarding the UGTT 
and a broader discourse surround-
ing the ethics and efficacy of nation-
al unions. This allowed me to devel-
op a more extensive comprehension 
of how the union is perceived. The 
UGTT is in quite a unique posi-
tion, whether viewed as a nation-
al union, political institution, civil 
society group, etc. However, in the 
Post-Democratic era, the UGTT 
does not seem to use its advantag-
es to change the material conditions 
for workers—purchasing power is 
low, and social unrest is high. This 
begs the question: is the union pur-
posefully avoiding a more radical 
approach to maintain its power sta-
tus à la Michels’ Iron Law of Oligar-
chy,35 or does it believe that its strat-
egy is truly the most effective for its 
aims? These are vital questions that 
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of possibilities that the UGTT can 
either create for Tunisia, or hinder.
are highly relevant to the explora-
tion and imagination of the realm 
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This picture shows the Great Mosque in the Medina of Sousse, a city on the coast of Central Tunis. Will Rowe 
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